Not enough aircraft will be equipped at the original deadline
In an interesting but not unexpected move last week (april 22, 2020) the European Commission and EASA published an amendment to Implementing Regulation EU No 1207/2011 that effectively delays the mandatory retrofit of aircraft with ADS-B to 2023. It turns out that not enough aircraft are expected to be equipped by the deadline.
The original plan was like this:
Every aircraft that is flying IFR faster than 250kts or that is heavier than 5700kg must have at least ADS-B out
Implementing Regulation EU No 1207/2011 Surveillance Performance and Interoperability Implementing Rule, SPI-IR
As you can see the original deadlines of 2015 and 2017 had already been moved to 2020. So why was that and why now again?
Have a look at the numbers
It is really quite simple: in June 2020 only about 74% will be equipped. If nothing happens the rest will be grounded. Who is the rest?
Aircraft that have problems with the deadline
Some of these aircraft only just got a certified ADS-B solution, others never will and some will be retired. For most it is a combination of cost and availability of equipment and hangar space.
Delays and exemptions are now possible
The EU came with the following solution to cater for this:
A permanentexemption for historic (or just old) aircraft.
An exemption for aircraft that are about to be decommissioned.
Under certain conditions more time for aircraft with an airworthiness certificate from between 1995 and DEC 2020. All the way up to 7 JUN 2023.
New aircraft with a certificate of airworthiness on or after 7 DEC 2020 must comply.
After call “80” at 80 knots, the takeoff is only aborted for serious events such as engine failure, engine fire, directional controls or an obstructed runway. Some operators choose 70 or even 100 knots but most use 80. This is also because most modern airplanes have a flight phase inhibit for certain warnings at that speed up to 1500 feet AGL. V1 is usually higher than 80 kts. A typical value for a Challenger 350 is between 119 and 130 kts. Then there is also reaction time:
With a typical acceleration of 3 to 6 knots per second, just 3 seconds for assessing the situation and decision-making, will add 9 to 18 knots to the speed. If the aircraft is close to V1, it now most likely has exceeded it.
NLR-TP-2010-177
The data
For this report a dataset of 135 high speed aborts was analyzed. There are some interesting numbers in there:
In more than 80% of the high speed aborts, the decision was made after V1
Source: NLR report TP-2010-177
In 90% of these cases the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway.
In about half of those cases, the decision to abort was correct or unknown
Source: NLR report TP-2010-177
Only 20 to 25% of all rejected takeoffs are caused by engine failure.
The other 75% by something else.
The Takeoff Safety Training Aid
An old FAA training tool exists, called “The Takeoff Safety Training Aid.” The program consists of a detailed article with the title “Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety” and a movie: “Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go Decision”
The movie looks like a VHS-style movie from the previous century (because it is) and can be found on Youtube:
The full description of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid can it be found under this link.
So….
Has the question been solved: What if there is enough runway after V1? Well, how do you know if it is enough? And also, how do you know if the failure prohibits the aircraft from flying? There are plenty of cases where the late decision ended badly:
Runway Overrun During Rejected Takeoff in Bedford, MA 5/31/14
Bizarre stuff, good material for lessons on the importance of sop’s.
Runway overrun after rejected take-off, MD-88, Groningen Airport Eelde
On the runway checks were performed. FDR data indicated a stabilizer position change from 6.8 to 7.2 degrees aircraft nose up (ANU). Thereafter the crew initiated a static engine spin-up. Again the stabilizer warning sounded. The crew released the brakes and started the take-off roll. From the CVR it is derived that during the entire take-off roll the warning sounded continuously. When attempting to rotate the captain experienced a heavy elevator control force. The captain stated that he needed much more than normal back pressure on his control column to lift the nose. He felt ”it was impossible to make the take-off”, and as the nose did not rise he decided to reject the take-off. Post accident analysis revealed that the rejection was initiated at 128 knots.
I guess it remains a problem. Apart from some of the strange decisions above, the only time where it is actually very clear that you can and must stop after V1 is in the sim on a 4 km runway where at Vr you feel that the elevator has “mysteriously” become jammed so you stop on the remaining 3 km of runway….
According to the report it is a about a 50/50 choice:
Many high speed rejected takeoffs (44%) should not have been conducted. This number is only slightly less than before the introduction of the training aid (51%); Pilots have difficulties in recognising “unsafe to fly” conditions.
ThomsonFly 757 bird strike & flames captured on video
Here’s an interesting video that was brought to my attention today by a Captain from India.
On Feb 16th 2017, Jet Airways’ flight 9W-118 from Mumbai (India) to London Heathrow failed to make contact with German ATC after being handed over from Bratislava. The aircraft was finally intercepted in German airspace near Cologne at FL360.
The best part about this video is the excellent quality of the footage that was filmed from an other airliner on the same track at a higher level.
Read the full factual description of this incident at the Aviation Herald.
